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The "market for innovation" — the sale and licensing of patents — is an often discussed source of
incentives to invest in R&D. This article presents and estimates a model of the transfer and renewal
of patents that, under some assumptions, allows us to quantify the gains resulting from the transfer
of patents in the market for innovation. The gains from trade measure the benefits of reallocating the
ownership of a patent from the original inventor to a new owner for whom the patent has a higher
value. In addition, we study the effect that lowering the costs of technology transfer has on the proportion
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The "market for innovation" — the sale and licensing of patents— is an often discussed source of
incentives to invest in R&D. The gains that original inventors can obtain from this market –
and the corresponding incentives to invest in R&D – are greater the greater are the extra-proﬁts
that non-inventors can generate from the innovation. Previous research scholars have associated
these gains from trade to comparative advantages in manufacturing and advertising (Teece, 1986;
Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006), to vertical specialization (Teece, 1986; Arora and Gambardella,
1994; Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001), and to the impossibility to control ex-ante the
exact nature and scope of utilization of innovations (Rosenberg, 1996). Moreover, transactions
in patent rights are also important because they can increase the nature of competition between
the small ﬁrms, that lack the capacity of large scale development, and the large ﬁrms, that may
have a comparative advantage in the development and commercialization process (Gans, Hsu and
Stern, 2002).
Despite the potential beneﬁts associated with markets for innovation, little empirical system-
atic evidence exists on the importance of these beneﬁts for ﬁrms. In this paper, we provide
evidence on the gains from trade in the market for innovation. The magnitude of these beneﬁts
has been the subject of many recent debates about patent policy reform and the importance that
small ﬁr m sp l a yi nt h ee c o n o m y . 1 If these beneﬁts were signiﬁcant, they could potentially oﬀset
traditional patent policy concerns about increased market power and ineﬃciencies associated with
the granting of monopoly rights. For small ﬁrms, being innovations often their critical assets, the
ability to license and sell their patents may be an important source of their incentives to invest in
R&D, especially because of the lack of capacity of large scale development and commercialization.
Empirical studies quantifying the beneﬁts from the market for innovation have traditionally
been hampered by a lack of systematic data on the transactions in patent rights (Arora, 1997;
Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001; Robbins, 2009). Our analysis focuses on the sale of patents.
From an empirical point of view, an interesting feature of the sale of patents –that distinguishes it
from the licensing of patents– is the fact that the sale of patents is most often publicly recorded
because of the legal requirement that all patent sales have to be ﬁled with the United States
Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) in order to be legally binding (Dykeman and Kopko,
2004). This property of patent sales allows us to link these transactions to patent numbers, which
can then be merged to the basic patent data that others have used: the payment of renewal fees,
patent citations, the patent’s issue date, a patentee identiﬁer, etc. (Griliches, 1992; Pakes and
1See report on the "The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition" by
the Federal Trade Commission (March, 2011).
2Schankerman, 1984; Hall, Jaﬀe and Tratjenberg, 2001). Moreover, the market for the sale and
acquisition of patents is increasingly popular for ﬁrms. For instance, large ﬁr m ss u c ha sI B Ma n d
Dell have recently made available for sale hundreds of their patents. At the same time, several
patent auctions, patent exchanges, and patent brokers have emerged in recent years.2 But, the
sale of patents is not important just solely for large ﬁrms. For small ﬁrms the rate of the sale
of patents is higher than for the large ﬁrms, and this number is much higher when weighted by
patent quality (Serrano, 2010).
The information on the sale and renewal of patents allows us, under some assumptions, to
recover the gains from trade and the distribution of the value of holding patents. To do so, we
develop and estimate a model of patent sales and renewals. The starting point of our model is
Schankerman and Pakes (1986) and Pakes (1986). They examine the problem of a patent owner
deciding in each time period whether or not to pay a renewal fee, and thereby to extend the life
of a patent, in a context with heterogeneity in the economic value of inventions. The distinct
element of our theory is the introduction of the possibility of the arrival of opportunities for
surplus-enhancing transfers, which may lead to a new owner for whom the patent has a higher
value. However, to transfer the patent to a new owner involves a cost of technology transfer.
The gains from trade measure the net beneﬁts of reallocating the ownership of a patent from the
original inventor to a new owner. Therefore, whereas Pakes and Schankerman’s framework has
one margin –whether the patent owner should pay the fee for renewing the patent– our model
has a second margin –whether the cost of technology transfer should be covered to reallocate the
patent to an alternative owner.
In our empirical analysis, we will focus on patents applied for and granted to small ﬁrms. We
operationalize this focus on small ﬁrms by restricting attention to ﬁrms with no more than 500
employees as of the application date of the patent. There is a number of reasons that support
our focus on small ﬁrms. The ﬁrst one is that in the policy arena there exists special interest in
the importance that the market for innovation plays on the incentives to invest in R&D by small
ﬁrms. Another reason is that by focusing on small ﬁrms the economic forces that we highlight will
be more salient than in transactions involving the patents from larger ﬁrms.3 A tt h es a m et i m e ,
the focus on small ﬁr m sa l l o w su st op a r a l l e lo u re m p i r i c a l analysis with the existing theory on
patent renewals, in which the decision making is at the patent level. Furthermore, small ﬁrms are
interesting in their own right, given the importance they play in the innovation process (Arrow,
2Examples of patent brokers and market intermediaries are Inﬂexion Point, IPotential, Ocean Tomo, ICAP.
3Serrano (2010) reports that patents granted to large corporations may not only be traded for the technology
that they represent, but also as a result of large acquisitions that may be pursued to increase the buyer’s market
share in a particular product market, etc.
31983 and Acs and Audretsch, 1998).
The parameters of the model are estimated using the simulated generalized method of moments
(McFadden, 1989 and Pakes and Pollard, 1989). The empirical moments we use to identify these
parameters describe both the patent life cycle properties of the trading and expiring decisions of
patent owners. The ﬁrst set of moments that refer to the trading decision: (1) the probability that
an active patent is traded at alternative ages conditional on having been previously traded; and
(2) the probability that an active patent is traded at alternative ages conditional on having been
previously untraded. The second set of moments relates to the expiring decision and how does
this decision interplays with past trading history of patents: (3) The probability that an active
patent is allowed to expire at alternative renewal dates conditional on having been previously
traded; and (4) the probability that an active patent is allowed to expire at alternative renewal
dates conditional on having been previously untraded. The joint set of moments describes both
the history of the trading and the renewal decision of patent owners over the life cycle of patents.
The model evaluated at the parameter estimates ﬁts the empirical moments reasonably well.
The model captures both the probability that a patent is traded is decreasing with age and the
previously traded patents being more likely to be traded than the previously untraded ones. The
model also reﬂects that previously traded patents are less likely to be allowed to expire than the
untraded ones. Fit is also assessed by the mean-squared diﬀerence between the empirical and the
simulated moments, as well as ﬁgures that outline both the empirical and simulated moments
pooled across patent grant years. Both methods show that the model evaluated at the parameter
estimates ﬁts well the empirical moments.
Several results emerge from the estimation. First, the value of the volume of the trade of
patents represents about 50% of the total value of all patents. The relative value of the volume
of the trade of patents is obtained by multiplying the number of patents traded in our simulation
times the average value at age one of a patent traded, and then divide by the total value of all
patents. In our analysis, the value at age one of a traded patent ($159466) is about three times
the value at age one of a non-traded patent ($50507) (all values are in 2003 US dollars),a n d
about 23% of the patents are traded at least once over their life cycle. The value at age one
of a patent was estimated at ($74684) This ﬁnding suggests that the gains from trade in the
market for innovation may be signiﬁcant, but the large diﬀerences between the average value of
the traded and untraded patents also indicate that there may be selection in the trade of patents.
Second, we ﬁnd that the gains from trade account for about 10% p e r c e n to ft h ev a l u eo ft h e
volume of the trade of patents. The gains from trade were obtained by comparing the value of a
patent actually traded with the value that the same patent would have obtained had the option
4to sell it to a potential buyer not been allowed for over the patent’s life cycle. An advantage of
structurally estimating the model is that the counterfactual of shutting down the option of selling
the patent allows us to quantify the gains from trade while accounting for selection in the transfer
of patents.
Third, we show that the distribution of the gains from trade is highly skewed. We ﬁnd that
about 50% percent of the patents had gains from trade below $3416, and these patents accounted
for only 37 percent of the total value of the gains from trade. At the same time, the top 10% of
the patents with the highest gains from trade (gains from trade higher or equal than $30970 per
patent) accounted for about 70 percent of the total value of the gains from trade. Furthermore,
we demonstrate that the top one percent of the patents represented about 25% of the total gains
from trade. This ﬁnding is what we expect, since higher quality patents are more likely to be
traded and the distribution of the value of patents is known to be skewed (Schankerman and
Pakes, 1986; Pakes, 1986). The relative small proportion of patents with signiﬁcant gains from
trade may have important implications on the workings and institutional settings of the market
for innovation.
Fourth, the remaining of the ﬁndings refers to the eﬀect that the lowering the costs of tech-
nology transfer has on the market for innovation. In a counterfactual experiment, we dropped the
estimated sunk cost of technology transfer (estimated at about $5500)b yﬁfty percent. As an
outcome to the experiment, here are two results we want to highlight. First, we found that the
proportion of traded patents increases by six percentage points (from 231% to 296%). Second,
we determine that the gains from trade increased by about 10%, and that the additional gains
from trade come from patents with returns above the median and below the ninetieth percentile of
the distribution of initial returns at age one. This ﬁnding, in our opinion, shows that the potential
beneﬁts associated with a potential reduction of the costs of technology transfer are limited.
Taken together, our empirical ﬁndings indicate that the market for innovation generates sig-
niﬁcant gains from trade, and that only a small proportion of the traded patents accounts for a
signiﬁcant share of the gains. Moreover, the costs of technology transfer aﬀect this process by
reducing the proportion of patents traded and by creating a selection in the transfer of patents,
but the beneﬁts of reducing these costs from the current levels on the realized gains from trade
appear to be limited. Our interpretation is that as long as small ﬁrms can appropriate part of the
gains from trade, this market increases the incentives to innovate; but that the potential beneﬁts
in gains from patent trades could be generated from reducing costs of technology transfer may be
limited.
This paper contributes to both the literature on the measurement of the beneﬁts of market
5for innovation and to the estimation of the value of patent protection. The empirical documen-
tation of gains from trade in the markets for innovation has been hard. Previous related work
has provided estimates on the volume of trade of technology. This empirical analysis has typi-
cally involved strategic alliances’ data and industry case studies. Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella
(2001) estimate the volume of trade in technology as 10-15 percent of non-defense R&D spending,
and that this volume has grown over the last two decades. More recently, Robbins (2009) calcu-
lates that technology licensing by U.S. multinationals abroad accounted for about $60 billion of
their receipts in 2002.4 Both approaches face the challenge that the selection in the transfer of
technology, such as the possibility that "the best" technologies are more likely to be traded and
licensed, might generate a high volume of trade of technology while the realized gains from trade
may be much smaller. Another challenge is that the licensing of patents is generally not publicly
recorded; only patent licenses of signiﬁcant value and involving publicly traded corporations are
publicly reported. In addition, the costs of transfer of technology are not accounted for in previous
empirical analysis. These potential issues are likely to be important in the market for innovation,
given that the distribution of the value of innovation has been previously found to be skewed.
Our work also contributes to a well-known literature estimating the value of holding patents
(Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; Pakes, 1986; Putnam, 1996; Lanjouw, 1998; Schankerman, 1998;
Deng, 2007; and Bessen, 2008). In this literature, scholars have previously used the schedule of
renewal fees and renewal decisions on patents to identify the distribution of the value of holding
patents at alternative ages. Our work is distinct in that we use data on the transfer of patents
at alternative ages, together with the renewal fees and renewal decisions, in order to recover the
distribution of the value of holding patents at alternatives ages. The new data on patent sales
allow us to build on their work in two ways. First, we estimate how much of the value of holding
a patent is due to the possibility of selling the patents to potential buyers. In other words, we
can uncover, under some assumptions, an estimate of the gains from trade in the market for
innovation. Second, the identiﬁcation of the parameters of the distribution of the initial per
period returns is not uniquely based on observables from patents presumably in the left tail of
this distribution (the renewal decisions), but also on observables of what appears to be high value
patents (the traded patents). To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt quantifying
the gains from trade using patent data, as well as to estimate the value of holding a patent using
information on the transfer of patents.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the
4Robbins (2009) uses internal records of the Bureau of Economic Analysis International Services trade data
for licensing fees and royalty revenues reported on corporate tax returns. This estimate involves patent licensing
royalties involving subsidiaries of the same parent ﬁrm.
6estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the data sources and the patterns of the transfer and
renewal of patents. Section 5 presents the estimation results of the distribution of patent value.
Section 6 presents the results concerning the volume of the market for innovation and the gains
from trade. Section 7 studies the eﬀects of decreasing the costs of technology transfer on the
proportion of patents traded and the gains from trade. Section 8 concludes the paper. All proofs
are included in the Appendix.
2 A Model of the Transfer of the Ownership of Patents
This section presents the model of the transfer and renewal of patents to be estimated. We
ﬁrst describe the decision making problem that a patent holder faces, and then present new
theoretical results that indicate how observations on the transfer and renewal decisions can provide
information on the gains from trade, costs of technology transfer, and the distribution of the value
of holding a patent.
The starting point for our theory is Schankerman and Pakes (1986) and Pakes (1986). They
examine the problem of a patent owner deciding in each period whether or not to pay a renewal
fee, and thereby extend the life of a patent, in a context with heterogeneity in the economic value
of inventions. Our contribution is adding the possibility of the arrival of opportunities for surplus-
enhancing transfers, which may lead to alternative potential owners having a greater valuation
of a patent than the current owner. In addition, we consider that to transfer a patent to a new
owner involves a transaction cost, a cost of technology transfer.
Alternative owners could generate a greater valuation than the current owner for a number of
reasons. The economics of innovation literature has associated this additional valuation with ver-
tical specialization (Teece, 1986; Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella, 2002), complementarities in assets
(Teece, 1986 and Gans and Stern, 2003), and comparative advantages in marketing or manufac-
turing (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006). As for the costs of technology transfer, previous scholars
have identiﬁed them with technology adoption, expropriation risk, and the use of intermediaries
such as patent lawyers (Arrow, 1962; Teece, 1977; and Astebro, 2002).
Assuming that both the transfer and renewal of patents are based on rational decision making
at the patent level, patent owners will only sell their patents whenever the price obtained is
higher than the value of retaining the ownership until the next period. Since transaction costs to
reallocate the patent to the potential buyer are also a factor, the patent will only be sold if the
added valuation is greater than the costs of technology transfer. Similarly, patent owners would
renew their patents if the value of keeping the patent until the next renewal date is higher than
7the renewal fee to be paid. If the renewal fees are not paid, the patent expires. If the patent
owner pays the renewal fees and keep the ownership of the patent, the patent holder would face
a similar problem next period. Finally, if a patent reaches its maximum legal length of patent
protection, the patent will expire next period.
Patent owners maximize the expected discounted value of per period returns and the price they
would obtain from selling their patent. Patent owners know the sequence of renewal fees and the
costs of technology transfer, but are uncertain aboutb o t ht h ea r r i v a lo fo p p o r tunities for surplus-
enhancing transfer and the sequence of per period returns that would be earned from retaining
the patent. In this context, patent owners will not necessarily sell their patent to a buyer with
higher returns because there is a positive probability that they will match in a future period with
another buyer with much higher returns. Similarly, patent owners will pay the renewal fees and
thereby retain for an extra period the patent ownership not only because the per period returns
from retaining the patent may be high, but also because there is a positive probability that a
future potential buyer will have much higher returns than them. The same decision problem will
be faced in future periods with the exception that the patent horizon is shorter. An implication of
the shorter horizon is that the patent holder will have less time to meet a buyer with high returns,
and the potential buyer will have less time to amortize the sunk costs of technology transfer.
More formally, let () be the expected discounted value of patent protection prior to the
transfer and renewal decision from a patent of age  with per period return  if kept by current
owner and  if sold to the best potential buyer. If the renewal fee is not paid, the patent expires
and ()=0  If the patent is not sold and the renewal fee paid, the owner earns the per period
return  and keeps the patent until the next renewal date. If the patent is sold, the buyer earns
per period return  and pays the renewal fee. For simplicity, we will assume that the current
owner obtains all the surplus in the sale (results are similar if there is Nash bargaining).5 The
value of holding a patent prior to the renewal and selling decision is:
()=m a x {0
 ()
 ()}
where the age of the patent is  ∈ {1}is the maximum legal length of patent protection,
and  
 () and  
 () are the values of keeping and selling the patent, respectively. In
5The results may diﬀer if the bargaining process is not eﬃcient. Ineﬃciency could arise due to asymmetric
information regarding  or . Asymmetric information is less likely tob es o u r c eo fc o n c e r ni nt h et r a n s f e ro f
patents than in their licensing. For instance, if there was signiﬁcant asymmetric information about , the current
owner and potential buyer could write a licensing agreement with an option to buy the patent. The option of
licensing should decrease the degree of asymmetric information as of the time the patent is sold. In any case, if
there was asymmetric information, the decision whether or not a patent had been previously traded would also be
a state variable. The analysis of that decision problem, while interesting, is beyond the scope of this paper.
8particular,  
 () is the sum of the per period patent return  and the option value of the
patent minus the renewal fee .  
 () is the price the current owner would obtain from selling
the patent, which given the previous assumptions, is equal to the sum of the per period return
that the buyer would earn  and the option value of the patent minus the renewal fee and the
costs of technology transfer. Therefore we have
 
 ()= + [+1(00)|Λ] − 
 
 ()= + [+1(00)|Λ] −  − 
where  ∈ (01) is a discount factor,  i st h er e n e w a lf e ea ta g e,  are the costs of technology
transfer, Λ is the information set of the patent owner prior to the transfer and renewal decision in
the  year of the patent, and [|Λ] is an expectation operator over the sequence of per period
returns from internal (0) and external (0) opportunities conditional on the set of information
Λ.
The following assumptions simplify the description of the decision making problem of a patent
holder. We have divided these assumptions into three groups. The ﬁrst group of them allows us
to complete the description of the option value of the patent.
Assumption 1 (A1) (00|Λ)=(00|) where (|) denotes a conditional
probability,  ∈ {0} is the decision to keep the patent, sell it, or let it expire, and
 is a vector of parameters.
Assumption 2 (A2) Patent holders and potential buyers know the sequence of renewal fees 
that will be required to be paid in order to keep the patent active. Furthermore, the renewal
fee schedule in every renewal date is increasing with the age of the patent.
The option value of a patent now depends only on the current per period return of the patent
owner (), the return of the potential buyer (), and the decision to keep or sell the patent ().
Assumption A1 implies that the past history of per period returns does not aﬀect the future
returns. Assumption A2 is consistent with the fact that renewal fees are increasing with the age
of the patent at alternatives renewal dates. Therefore, under the above assumptions, the option




The second group of assumptions allows us to simplify the decision problem of a patent
9holder. We will ﬁrst motivate these assumptions, and then group them into assumptions A3-A5.
Assumption A3 considers that the return under the best outside opportunity, 0 depends on the
current internal return, 0 This is motivated by the fact that while per period returns may be
ﬁrm speciﬁc, it is also likely that they will be patent speciﬁc. Assumption A4 considers that the
internal return 0 depends on the previous realized return ( if  =  or  if  = ), but it
does not depend on the alternative return that was not realized ( if  =  and  if  = ).
This assumption is consistent with a framework where the arrival of new innovations depend
on the innovations that have been adopted but not of those that were not. In assumption A5,
we consider as true that the process of internal returns is the same for all patents with the same
period return independently of whether or not the patent had previously changed ownership. This
premise allows us to simplify the decision problem of patent owner, excluding the possibility that,
conditional on patent returns, future patent returns may depend on the past history of trading
decisions. An implication of the previous assumptions is that the law of motion (00|)





 (0|)] These assumptions are summarized into Assumptions
A3-A5.
Assumption 3 (A3) Let (00|)=

(0|0) ∗ 




 are probability functions. The return under the best outside opportunity, 0 depends






Assumption 4 (A4) The internal return 0 depends on the previous period realized return (
if  =  or  if  = ) but not on the alternative return that was not realized ( if  = 






 (0|) if  = 


 (0|) if  = 
)
Assumption 5 (A5) Conditional on the realized return at previous period, the internal return







Finally, the remaining two assumptions are made for convenience and simplicity, and allow us
10to characterize the solution of the decision making problem of the patent holder. Assumption A6
considers that the costs of technology transfers are sunk. Furthermore, we suppose that they are
independent of the per period patent returns and age. This assumption is motivated by the fact
that previous scholars have identiﬁed these costs with large ﬁxed noncapital and capital costs of
adoption, organizational changes, and intermediaries such as patent lawyers and brokers (Teece,
1977 and Åstebro, 2002).
Assumption A7 considers that the transition probability of external and internal returns come
from random walk processes. In particular, we have that the transition probability of internal
returns, 
 (0|) (if  = )o r
 (0|) (if  = ), comes from a random walk process 0 = 

(if  = )a n d0 = 
 (if  = )w h e r e
 is a random variable non-increasing with  and
independent of . The assumption that the process of internal returns 
 is independent with  is
consistent with the relationship between ﬁrm growth and ﬁrm size (ﬁrm growth is independent
of ﬁrm size). We also need that patent returns do not increase too fast. A suﬃcient condition is
that, for a given  the probability that next period returns are higher than a given number is
decreasing with patent age (A7.1). To parallel the characteristics of the process of internal returns,
we assume that the process of external returns 

(0|0) is also a random walk process such that
0 = 0
 0 where 0
 is a random variable non-increasing with  and independent of 0 (A7.2). We
think of the improvement factor 
 as the arrival of opportunities for surplus-enhancing via the
sale of patents relative to the in-house use and the licensing proceeds of the current owner. This
is because the per period patent returns of the current owner may represent the proceeds both
from using the technology in-house as well as licensing it to others.6 That 0
 is independent of
the unobservable patent return  will allow us to prove that there exists a selling cutoﬀ rule and
to characterize its properties as a function of the patent age  and the patent return .7
Assumption 6 (A6) Patent holders and potential buyer know the costs of technology transfer
 that will be required to be paid in order to transfer and adopt the patent. Furthermore,
the costs of technology transfer are sunk and constant with the age of the patent.
6There are no systematic data on patent licensing revenue, but there is anecdotal evidence. IBM’s licensing
revenue was $1.6 billion in the year 2000 (Berman (2002) as reported in Merrill, Levin and Myers (2004)). In
1996, U.S. corporations received $66 billion in income from royalties of unaﬃliated entities (Degnan, 1998). Texas
Instruments reported to have obtained $1.6 billion in licensing royalties from 1996 to 2003 (Grindley and Teece,
1997).
7The economic process we have considered here assumes that buyers of patents are adopters and users of the
acquired technology rather than ﬁrms specializing in managing patents. For instance, a ﬁrm could exclusively focus
on managing a patent by licensing it to many others who can then adopt it, but ﬁrms exclusively managing patents
are a rather new organizational form mainly associated with ﬁrms acquiring patents for prospective litigation
purposes.
11Assumption 7 (A7) The transition probabilities 

(0|0) and 
 (0|) come from random
walks processes. That is:
0 = 0
 0
where 0 is a random variable non-increasing in  and independent of 0 with cdf 
that
is continuous in 0 at every 0 such that, for a given 0 and return  the 

(0  |0)




 if  = 
0
 if  = 
)
where 0 is a random variable non-increasing in  independent of  with cdf 
that is
continuous in 0 at every  such that, for a given  and  the 
 (0  |) decreases with
.
2.1 The selection and horizon eﬀect
To characterize when a patent holder will decide to sell, to keep, or lto et its patent expire, we
must describe the properties of the value function and option value of a patent. The following
Lemma shows that the value function of a patent is continuous, weakly increasing in the returns
of the patent, weakly increasing in the return of potential buyers, and weakly decreasing in patent
age.
Lemma 1. The value function () is continuous and weakly increasing in the current return
of the holder of the patent,  and the return factor of the potential buyer,  The option
value +1(00|) is weakly decreasing in .
Proof. See appendix.
Based on the results from this Lemma, the following proposition shows that the solution to
the problem of the ﬁrm can be summarized into two cutoﬀ rules — b () and b 
() —t h a td i v i d e
the state space into three areas (keep, sell or do not renew).
Proposition 1. For each age, there exist cutoﬀ rules b () and b 
() such that patents with
an improvement factor above b 
() will be sold. Among the patent holders that met a
potential buyer with improvement factor below b 
() the patents with per period returns
 above b () will be renewed, and those with returns  below b () will be retained by their
current owners.
Proof. See Appendix.











Current return to the owner
Improvement 
factor
Probability of being traded
Figure 1 presents the results of this proposition. In the vertical axis we have the improvement
factor of the best potential buyer while in the horizontal axis we have the per period return of
the current patent owner prior to the trading and renewal decision. The ﬁrst cutoﬀ is the per
period return b () that makes the owner indiﬀerent between keeping the patent or letting it
expire. This is a vertical line that separates the regions "Don’t renew" and "Keep." This is the
well known Pakes and Schankerman’s renewal rule. The second cutoﬀ b 
() is new. This is
the improvement factor that makes a patent owner indiﬀerent between selling or not selling a
patent with per period return  and age . This is the curve that separates the region "Sell"
from the regions "Don’t renew" and "Keep." If a patent holder faces a potential buyer with an
improvement factor above the cutoﬀ b 
() the patent will be sold. These patents belong to the
"Sell" region. Moreover, as long as the improvement factor is lower than b 
() patents with
lower per period returns than b () will be allowed to expire, this is the "Don’t renew" region,
and the ones with per period return higher than b () will be renewed and retained by the current
owner. This is the "Keep" region. The following proposition characterizes the properties of the
function b 
() and b () with  and .
Proposition 2. The following properties characterize the functions b () and b 
():
(a) The function b () is increasing with patent age  at the renewal dates.
(b) If the costs of technology transfer  are positive, then
(b.1) For a ﬁxed patent age , the function b 
() is decreasing with ;
(b.2) For a ﬁxed patent return ,t h ef u n c t i o nb 
() is increasing with 
Proof. See Appendix.
13The ﬁndings in Proposition 2 are intuitive. In part (a), the renewal cutoﬀ b () increases with
patent age  because while the fee schedule increases with , the per period returns do not on
average increase with . This result is consistent with both Schankerman and Pakes (1986) and
Pakes (1986). In part (b.1), we show that b 
() is decreasing with patent returns (). The new
result is intuitive. If for a given improvement factor  the gains from trade by potential buyers
a r es c a l e du pb yt h ep a t e n tr e t u r n s, the higher is  the lower is the necessary improvement
factor to amortize the costs of technology transfer. Lastly, part (b.2) of the proposition shows
that for a ﬁxed patent return , the function b 
() is monotonically increasing with patent age
 This is because for a given patent return  a shorter horizon implies less time to amortize the
costs of technology transfer.8
Clearly, the functions b 
() and b () together with the distribution of improvement factor
and the distribution of the per period returns of a patent at age  and prior the decision of
the patent holder, determine the probability that an active patent will be sold, kept, or let to
expire. The probability that a patent with return  will be sold at age  is the likelihood that an
improvement factor is above b 
()
An immediate implication from Proposition 2 is that there is both a selection and horizon
eﬀect in the trading of patents. There is a selection eﬀect because the probability than an active
patent is traded at age  increases with the patent return .N o t et h a ta s increases the cutoﬀ
rule b 
() decreases and thus the probability that a patent is being traded increases. The
selection eﬀect implies that traded patents, and especially those that have been recently traded,
have on average higher returns than the previously untraded ones as of the time of the trading
decision. This result is consistent with evidence on the transfer of patents. Patents with higher
number of patent citations received are more likely to be traded (Serrano, 2010).
There is a horizon eﬀect because, for a ﬁxed patent return , the probability that an active
patent is being traded decreases with patent age. Note that as the patent age increases the cutoﬀ
rule b 
() decreases with age and thus the probability that a patent is being traded decreases
with age too because the random variable 
 is independent of  The horizon eﬀect accounts for
why the proportion of active patents being traded may decrease with patent age. This result is
also consistent with evidence on the transfer of patents.
8The key elements that allows Serrano to prove these results is that the costs of technology transfer is not
proportional the to the diﬀerence between the value of selling and keeping a patnet. To the extent that a part of
this costs is sunk, and thus does not fully internalize how the diﬀerence between the value of selling or not selling a
patent changes as the revenue and age of the patent varies the result will hold. In other words, a part of the costs
of technology transfer could principle depend on the current patent return  and the age of the patent  On the
other hand, if the costs of technology transfer was proportional to the diﬀerence between the value of selling and
the value of keeping the patent, then neither part (b.1) nor (b.2) would hold.
142.2 Discussion of the results
The previous results suggest that observations on the transfer and renewal decisions can provide
information on the distribution of the value of holding a patent, gains from trade, and the costs
of technology transfer. First, observations of the proportion of patents allowed to expire and
their corresponding renewal fees provide information to identify the distribution of patent value
at alternatives ages. An implication of Proposition 1 and 2 is that the probability that an active
patent is allowed to expire at age  is the proportion of active patents at age  with per period
returns  above b () and that the cutoﬀ b () is increasing with patent age at alternative renewal
dates. Previous scholars have used the observed proportion of patents renewed at alternatives
dates, together with the schedule of renewal fees, to estimate the distribution of the value of
holding patents at alternatives ages.
Second, the selection into the trading decision suggests that observations on the trading of
patents can provide additional information about the distribution of patent returns. At alternative
ages we observe whether patents are traded, kept by their owners, or let to expire. Based on the
selection eﬀect, traded patents will have on average the highest returns of all. Patents retained by
their owners will have, on average, lower returns than the traded patents. This is because patent
owners holding patents with high per period returns will pay the renewal fees at alternative renewal
dates not only because their current returns are high, but also because they also have a higher
probability than the rest of patent holders to ﬁnd a buyer with much higher returns. The rest of
the patents, which will be let to expire, will have the lowest returns. Therefore, observations on
the trading decision are also informative about the distribution of patent returns.
Third, observations of patents being traded can provide information about the resulting gainss.
For a given distribution of per period returns at age  and prior to the transfer and renewal
decision, the observed proportion of patents being traded at age  will be associated with the
proportion of buyers with improvement factors above the selling cutoﬀ b 
() Assuming that the
transfer of a patent is based on decision making at the patent level characterized by the function
b 
() conditional on patent age and the distribution of patent returns, higher proportions of
patents being traded will be associated with higher gains from patent trading. Thus, the observed
proportion of traded patents at alternatives ages will provide some information on the distribution
of the process of external returns (improvement factor), which determines the gains from trade in
patents.
Fourth, observations of patents being traded at alternative ages can provide information about
the costs of technology transfer. Conditional on the distribution of per period returns at alterna-
15tive ages and the properties of the process of external returns, the decreasing pattern with age
of the observed proportion of active patents being traded will be associated with the costs of
technology transfer. Proposition 2 suggests that for a ﬁxed patent return and a distribution of
the process of external returns, the decreasing pattern of the observed proportion of patents being
traded with age depends on the costs of technology transfer. Higher costs of technology transfer
imply steeper decreasing patterns with age of the proportion of patents being traded.
Finally, the renewal rates of previously traded and untraded patents can provide additional
information about both the gains from trade and costs of technology transfer. Conditional on
the distribution of patent returns at alternative ages, the diﬀerence between the renewal rates of
previously traded and untraded patents allows us to infer something about both the gains from
trade of previously traded patents and the costs of technology transfer. In particular, higher costs
of technology transfer and higher improvement factors, will imply a larger diﬀerence between the
renewal rates of previously traded and the untraded patents. On the other hand, while higher costs
of technology transfer imply that the proportion of patents being traded at a given age decreases;
higher improvement factors will increase, on average, the proportion of patents being traded at a
given age. Thus, information about the renewal rates of previously traded and untraded patents
c a np r o v i d ei n f o r m a t i o no nb o t ht h ep r o c e s st h a t determines the gains from trade and the costs
of technology transfer.
2.3 Model stochastic speciﬁcation
Initial per period patent returns Following the literature on the estimation of patent
value we assume that initial patent returns are lognormally distributed:
log(1) ∼ 1()
where 1() is a normal distribution. Previous scholars using survey data have shown that
lognormal distributions provide a reasonable ﬁt to the distribution patent returns (Harhoﬀ,N a r i n ,
Scherer, and Vopel, 1999).
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16where  =  if the patent was retained by its current owner,  =  if the patent was sold, and
1
This stochastic process has an economic interpretation. At each age, patent owners and
potential buyers ﬁnd out whether patent returns may become obsolete (
 =0 )and thus they
become zero or alternatively the returns depreciate at a rate 1( 
 = ) An advantage of
this speciﬁcation is that patent returns evolve stochastically. Conservatively, we have chosen to
assume that the transition of internal patent returns is independent of patent age. Although
this assumption undoubtedly represents a strong restriction on the process of internal returns,
identifying age dependence in such stochastic process with U.S. patent renewal data may be
challenging. This is because there are no renewal fees due until the fourth year following a patent
grant date.9
Transition of external patent returns and costs of technology transfer We assume
that there is a positive probability  that the patent return earned by the potential buyer following
a patent sale will be  =0  Alternatively, there is a probability (1 − ) that the patent return
earned by the potential buyer will be based on the improvement factor ∗ observed prior to the
decision of selling the patent. In this case we will have that  = ∗ where the random variable




 ) and 
 =  Consequently,




 if  =0
(1 − )[1 − exp( 
)] if 0
)
Previous literature on the markets for innovation provides little guidance concerning a process
to determine the gains from trading patents. An economic interpretation of the improvement fac-
tor 
 being independent of age can be that the exit of potential buyers that become patent owners
is compensated by an arrival process of potential buyers (perhaps new sequential innovators) such
that the distribution of the improvement factor of the best potential buyer is independent of
the age of the patent. As for explicitly allowing for uncertain patent returns associated with
the transfer of patents, previous scholars have reported that there are risks in the adoption of
technology.10
9Am o r eﬂexible stochastic process for 
 allowing for age dependence can, in principle, be estimated using both
the renewal and the transfer data. Serrano (2006) argued that a stochastic process where 
 depended on age could
be identiﬁed with information of the observed trading decisions prior to the ﬁrst renewal date. In addition, Serrano
(2006) used the ﬂow of patent citations received by a patent at alternatives ages to estimate the value of holding a
patent.
10The existence of uncertainty can also be thought of as re-interpretation of the benchmark model we previously
analyzed. The costs of technology transfer could now be explained as having both a ﬁxed () and a variable
17Measurement error Because there may be measurement error in the transactions recorded
at the USPTO, our speciﬁcation allows for it in the transfer of patents. The speciﬁcation we
consider is the following. Let ∗ and  be the true and the observed decision variables, respectively.
If  =0 ,t h e n∗ =0 ;I f = ,t h e n∗ = ; but if  = , then there is a probability 0 that
∗ 6= 
3 Estimation
The parameters of the model are characterized by the vector  =( ) The
discount factor is set to  =0 9 as in Pakes (1986). The rest of the parameters are jointly
estimated using the simulated generalized method of moments. This method involves ﬁnding  in
order to minimize the distance between the empirical moments, deﬁned as those from the data,
and the simulated moments generated by the model. The moments generated by the model are
simulated because they cannot be solved for analytically due to the fact that patent returns are
unobserved and serially correlated over time.
3.1 Estimation algorithm
More formally, let the  parameter vector 0 be the unique solution to ()=[ − ()] = 0,
where the vector  is deﬁned as the true hazard probabilities, and the vector () contains the
probabilities predicted from the model given a parameter vector .B o t h and () have dimension
, which is the number of moment conditions. Let  b et h es a m p l es i z e .T h es a m p l em o m e n t
condition is ()= −().T h ev e c t o r() contains the hazards simulated by the model
given the vector of parameters ;a n d represents the sample hazard proportions in the data.
The simulated minimum distance estimator, b  of the true parameter vector 0 is deﬁned as
b  =a r gm i n

[()]0[()]
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11The optimal weighting matrix would involve using the inverse of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of
the sample moment conditions. Since eﬃcient GMM is computationally very costly in our framework, we follow
Lanjouw (1998) and use a diagonal matrix that weights each moment according to the number of observations of
each sample hazard. Because the absolute value of the sample renewal rates approximately are ten times larger than
the transfer rates, our weighting matrix divide each element in the diagonal matrix by its corresponding squared
sample hazard. Thus, our minimization criterion is equivalent to one that minimizes the relative diﬀerences between
18Given that the conditions required to have the consistency and asymptotic normality of our
estimator are satisﬁed (Pakes and Pollard, 1989), and that () converges in probability to a
semi-deﬁnite matrix 0 we have that () converges in distribution to a normal distribution,
√
(0 ) → (0)
and b  converges to 0 and
√
(b  − 0) satisﬁes a central limit theorem
√






Ω = ([(0 )][(0 )]0)
3.2 Obtaining b 
There are a number of steps we follow to obtain the estimate b . First, we simulate the model in
order to obtain the vector of hazard probabilities (). This involves obtaining the cutoﬀ rules
b  and b 
 and the value function of keeping and selling the patent. The second step involves
ﬁnding the value of  that minimizes a metric of the distance between the simulated and the
empirical hazard probabilities.
Given a vector of parameters , the hazard probabilities () are generated by ﬁrst solving
the model and then simulating it. To solve the model, we compute both the value of keeping a
patent and the cutoﬀ rules of renewing and selling it. With the purpose of doing so, we solve
the model recursively, starting from the maximum legal length of patent protection and moving
backwards until the patent’s grant date. To obtain the value function of keeping the patent at
alternative ages, we discretize the per period return into a number of grid points.12 Solving the
value function backwards involves constructing cutoﬀ rules for selling and renewing a patent. At
each patent age we use this cutoﬀ rules in order to approximate the integral that deﬁnes the
the sample and the simulated hazards.
12We apply a grid of 10 points, but have used 100 and 300 grid points and found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Rather
than the number of points used in the grid, the important aspect is to chose their location based on the curvature
of the value function. The location of the grid points was chosen to match a lognormal distribution with parameter
similar to those of the current estimates of initial patent per period returns. This allowed us to ensure that the
density of the grid points is higher where the curvature of the value function is steeper.
19expected value of patent protection (i.e., the patent’s option value).13 The backward process ends
when we reach the patent’s age one. At this point, we have calculated the value of keeping a
patent at alternative ages and the grid points of the per period patent returns.
The life cycle history of  patents is simulated  times using the previously calculated values
of keeping and selling the patent. Simulating the life cycle of these patents consists of taking
pseudo-random draws from the distribution of the initial returns, and then pass each initial patent
return through the stochastic processes of internal and external patent returns, including the
measurement error in recorded transfers. History of trade and renewals decisions for each patent,
as well as their patent returns and patent value, are obtained and recorded. The simulated hazard
probabilities () are calculated by averaging out, over the number of patents and simulations,
the patent renewal and transfer decisions.
Finally, an algorithm based on simulated annealing methods is used to obtain the simulated
minimum distance estimate. Annealing methods are used because the objective function is likely
to be non-smooth and have multiple local minima.14 Parameter estimates and their respective
standard errors were obtained by applying a Newton method algorithm once the simulated an-
nealing method converged to the global minimum of the objective function of the estimator.
4D a t a
Our empirical analysis uses data we obtained from the United States Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce (USPTO) for the period 1981-2002. The key variables for our study are the indicators of
two important events in the lifetime of a patent: renewals and assignments.
Patent renewal data Patent applications become patents as of their grant date.15 Multiple
patent renewal fees must be paid to extend the life of a patent until its maximum legal length.
If a renewal fee is not paid at a renewal date, then the patent immediately expires.16 An u m b e r
of scholars have used the drop out rates at alternative renewal dates to estimate the distribution
of the value of holding patents (Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; Pakes, 1986, and others). In the
US, patents are subject to renewal fees only if they were applied for after December 12, 1980. We
have obtained these records, as of December 31, 2001, for patents applied for since December 12,
13We use quadrature methods to numerically approximate the value of the integral.
14In particular, we use the simulated annealing algorithm developed and tested in Goﬀe, Ferrier and Rogers
(1994).
15The maximum legal length of new patents applied for prior to 1995 was 17 years following their grant date.
This maximum legal lenght was subsequently modiﬁed to 20 years following patent application date. During ther
period 1981-2002 patent applications were granted on average in 2.5 years.
16The USPTO began charging renewal fees in 1984 on patents applied for after December 12, 1980.
201980 and granted after 1983 until the end of 2001. Similarly to the European patent data, the
amount of renewal fees is increasing with the age of the patent.17 However, whereas renewal fees
in Europe are characterized by yearly renewal dates and having all patentees paying the same
fee, renewal fees in the US are characterized by three renewal dates (at the end of 4, 8 and
12 years following a patent’s grant date) and having patentees paying diﬀerent fees depending
on whether their entity status is small or large. The USPTO deﬁnes small entities as individual
inventors, non-proﬁt organizations, universities, government agencies, and small businesses (ﬁrms
with less than 500 employees). Large entities are the rest of patentees, primarily large businesses
(ﬁrms with more than 500 employees). Small entities are subject to renewal fees that are half of
the amount than large entities pay.
Patent assignment data Another event that can happen during the life cycle of a patent
is what the USPTO calls “assignments.” We follow Serrano (2010) and use re-assignment data
to identify transfers of patents across ﬁrm boundaries. The source of this data is the USPTO
Patent Assignments Database. When a U.S. patent is transferred, an assignment is recorded at
the USPTO acknowledging the change in ownership. We have also obtained these records for all
transfers that occurred from 1981 to 2002. Some of the transfers recorded with the patent oﬃce
are administrative events, like a name change, as opposed to a true economic transfer between
two distinct parties.18 The procedure conservatively drops all the assignments that appear not
to be associated with an actual patent trade. The details of the procedures we used to deal with
the assignment data are explained in Serrano (2010). Most relevant for this analysis is that the
remaining assignment records identify the sale of a patent and have information about patent
numbers, making it possible to merge them at the patent level with the payment of renewal fees,
the patentee’s entity status, and other patent characteristics.19
Under Section 261 of the U.S. Patent Act, recording the assignment protects the patent owner
against previous unrecorded interests and subsequent assignments. If the patentee does not record
the assignment, subsequent recorded assignments will take priority. For these reasons, patent
owners have strong incentives to record assignments and patent attorneys strongly recommend
this practice (Dykeman and Kopko, 2004).
17Most of the previous literature used European patent data (starting with Schankerman and Pakes, 1986 and
Pakes, 1986).
18We also dropped records in which the buyer and seller are the same entity and in which the execution date is
either before the application date or after patent expiration. For additional details on the procedure, see Serrano
(2010).
19Lamoreaux and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 1999) and this paper are the only ones that explore patent assignments to study
markets for innovation. They used a sample of sales of private inventors patents and provided a historical account
of whether organized markets for technology existed in the late 19
th and early 20
th century.
21The dataset we have compiled is a panel of patents applied for after December 12, 1980 and
issued to US patentees since January 1, 1983 that details their history of trade and renewal
decisions until 2001.20 The data contains patent characteristics such as their grant year, the
patentee’s entity status, etc.
Our empirical analysis will focus on small ﬁrms. We operationalize this focus by restricting
attention to patents granted to ﬁrms and applied for businesses with no more than 500 employees.
In doing so, the economic forces that we highlight will be more salient than in transactions
involving the sales of patents by large corporations. About 78 percent of all the patents in the
period of analysis were granted to ﬁrms; the rest were granted to government agencies, individual
inventors, or were unassigned as of their issue date. In our dataset, small businesses patents
account for approximately 15 percent of all the patents granted to ﬁrms. They are more likely to
be traded and to receive patent citations than the large business patents. In addition, small ﬁrms
are interesting in their own right, given the important role they play in the innovation process
(Arrow, 1983 and Acs and Audretsch, 1998).21
Table 1 presents a summary of the renewal and the transfer rates of patents in our dataset.
The top part of the table presents the expiration rates of active patents at alternative renewal
dates for previously traded and untraded patents. Expiration rates of previously traded patents
are lower than the expiration rates of the previously untraded patents. In addition, the table
shows that the expiration rates increase with patent age. The bottom part of the table presents
the probability that an active patent is traded at alternatives ages for both the previously traded
and the untraded patents. The probability of trade of previously traded patents is higher than
the probability of trade for patents that were previously untraded. Furthermore, the table shows
that the probability of trade, whether or not the patent was previously traded, decreases with
age. In our previous work we showed that these patterns were consistent across type of patentees
and patent technology classes.22
20The advantage of focusing on U.S. businesses is that the ﬁrms are more comparable. The dissadvantage is
that the sample of patents decreases signiﬁcantly and that there is a decreasing time trend in the patenting of U.S.
businesses at the USPTO.
21Alternatively, we could have considered small innovators as in Serrano (2006, 2010). A small innovators patent
is patent owned by ﬁrms that were granted no more than ﬁve patents in a given year. Small innovators and small
business patents are highly correlated. The advantage of focusing on small businesses, instead of small innovators,
is that we categorize ﬁrms based on a traditional measure of ﬁrm size. In addition, the magnitude of patent fees
to be paid, including patent renewal fees are based on whether or not the ﬁrm is small or large businesses, and not
on the number of patents obtained. The dissadvantage of using small businesses is that it likely that some of them
are highly innovative (i.e., patent often) while others may not. The number of patents granted and applied for
small businesses is about half of the patents granted to small innovators, and small innovators represented about
thirty-three percent of all the patents granted to ﬁrms.
22Interestingly, the ﬁndings are similar independently of whether ﬁrm size is measured by patent counts (as in
Serrano, 2010) or number of employees.
22Table 1: Percentage of Active Patents Traded and Expired
Age All Not Previously Traded Previously Traded
(Years since last trade)
Any Year One year
A. Probability that an active patent is allowed to expire
5 17.3 17.9 12.9 6.8
9 27.9 28.8 23.6 12.3
13 28.4 29.0 26.6 19.4
B. Probability that an active patents is traded
2 3.16 2.88 7.21 7.21
7 2.73 2.31 4.52 6.37
11 2.41 2.13 3.40 2.74
16 2.36 1.13 2.98 -
Estimation sample Our estimation sample uses patents granted during the period 1988-
1997. This is a sub-sample of our dataset. Focusing on these years allow us to minimize the
eﬀects of the multiple patent policy changes during the last few decades. The most important
patent policy events were: (a) the drastic changes in patent fees during the early 1980s by US
Congress; (b) the perception that by the year 1986 the establishment of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (CAFC) reﬂected a "pro-patent" shift; and (c) the Patent Law Act of 1996
redeﬁning and extending the maximum legal length of patent protection.23 These policy changes
likely aﬀected the characteristics of the patents being applied for and thus the distribution of the
initial returns to patent protection.24 In the sample we use to estimate the model the distribution
of patent values will be less aﬀected by these policy changes.
There are 54840 patents distributed across ten cohorts in our estimation sample. Each cohort
is deﬁned as the grant year of a patent. There are 20790 patents granted for the years 1988-
23A challenge in using time series of renewal data to estimate a distribution of patent values is that changes in
patent policy may aﬀect the characteristics of innovations that ﬁrms applied for. During the last three decades
there have been three major changes in U.S. patent policy. First, patent fees were subject to drastic changes by
U.S. congress during the mid 1980s. We believe these changes aﬀected the type of innovations being applied for
and thus generated a non-stable distribution of the returns of patents applied for the period 1983-1987. Second, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was established by the U.S. Congress in 1982. The decisions of
the CAFC were widely viewed as reﬂecting a "pro-patent" shift by the year 1986 (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Jaﬀea n d
Lerner, 2004). We also think that these changes likely aﬀected the expected value of obtaining a patent, and thus
the characteristics and the number of patents that ﬁrms applied for. This likely lead to changes in the distribution
of initial per period patent returns. Finally, the Patent Law Act of 1996 extended the maximum legal length of
patent protection for patents applied for after 1996. The maximum legal length was changed from a maximum of
seventeen years following the patent’s grant date, to a maximum of twenty years following the application date.
This change may have aﬀected not only the value of patents, but also the characteristics of innovations being applied
for. Previous scholars have argued that the time from patent application to grant is not exogeneous. It depends on
the characteristics of the patent such as complexity of the technology, which may be correlated with patent value.
24While the analysis of these changes in patent policy may be interesting on its own, we have considered that
accounting for these patent policy changes in our estimation strategy is outside of the scope of our study.
231992 and 34050 for the rest of the cohorts. Each patent is observed on average 85 years in our
sample, but the maximum and minimum amount of time the patents can be observed is thirteen
and four years respectively depending on the patent’s grant year. The number of years a patent
is observed during its life cycle diﬀers across cohorts because our transfer and renewal data ends
in 2001. Patents granted in 1988 are observed from their issue date to age thirteen, and for the
patents granted in 1997 we only have data for the ﬁrst four years. For each of these granted
patents we will observe the trading and renewal decisions at alternative ages over their life cycle.
In the estimation of the structural parameters of our model, we maximize a criterion function
that measures the goodness of ﬁto ft h em o d e lt ot h ef o l l o w i n gs t y l i z e df a c t s :
1. The probability that an active patent is allowed to expire at a renewal date for previously
traded patents;
2. The probability that an active patent is allowed to expire at a renewal date for previously
untraded patents;
3. The probability that an active patent is being traded at a given age for previously traded
patents;
4. The probability that an active patent is being traded at a given age for previously untraded
patents.
The dimension of the vector of moment conditions will be  = 186, which is the sum of 36
conditional probabilities based on the renewal dates and 150 conditional probabilities based on
the transfer dates.25
5 Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates and the corresponding standard errors. On the top part
of this table, estimates for the initial distribution of patent returns as well as the processes of
depreciation and obsolescence can be found. The bottom part shows the parameter estimates for
the process of the gains from trade and the cost of technology transfer. The parameter estimates
are all positive and signiﬁcant.
25The 1988 patent cohort will count towards twelve probabilities in the trading decision (i.e., from age two to
thirteen), and three in the renewal dates for each the previously traded and the untraded patents. The 1997 patent
cohort, instead, will count towards three probabilities in the trading decision (i.e., from age 2 to four) and one in
the renewal decision (i.e, the ﬁrst renewal date).
24An indicator of how the estimated model ﬁts the data is comparing the empirical moments
and the simulated moments from the model. Figures 2 and 3 (see appendix) outline both the
empirical and simulated moments pooled across patent grant years. The model ﬁts the empirical
moments used in the estimation algorithm reasonably well. Figure 2 presents both the simulated
and empirical probabilities that an active patent is allowed to expire for previously traded and
untraded patents. The probability of an active patent is being allowed to expire conditional
on having been previously untraded is well ﬁtted by our model simulations. For the untraded
patents, however, the simulation generated by the model tends to predict less steepness than
what is observed in the data, especially in the second and last renewal date. This feature may be
due to unobserved patent heterogeneity in that some patents are more likely to be traded than
others independently of their patent returns. Alternatively, it could be due to our rather simple
speciﬁcation of the process of the transition of internal returns. For another moment that sheds
l i g h to nh o wt h ee s t i m a t e dm o d e lﬁts the data, Figure 3 presents the probability of that an active
patent is traded for previously traded and untraded patents.26 The model is able to capture well
the decreasing shape of both probabilities with age.27 Another indicator of the ﬁt of the model
is the sum of squared residuals of the diﬀerence between the estimated and the actual moment
conditions divided by the number of moment conditions (MSE). At the bottom of Table 2, we
show that the MSE is low (42447 ∗ 10−4).28 Putting these ﬁndings together, both indicators
suggest that our estimated model ﬁts the data well.
Parameters  and  determine the initial distribution of the per period returns as of the
grant date of patents. A high  implies a high degree of heterogeneity in initial patent returns.
Al o w implies that the initial per period returns to patents are low. The estimates of  and
 indicate that a large proportion of the patents in our data will start with very low per period
returns. Parameters  and  represent depreciation and obsolescence with age of patent returns,
respectively. The estimates of  and  imply that the per period returns of a patent decrease on
average at the rate of approximately thirteen percent a year. These parameters together accounts
for the distribution of initial returns and its evolution over the age of patents.
Table A-1 presents a summary of the distribution of per period returns at ages one, four, and
seven. This table and the remaining ones are in the appendix. The descriptive statistics provided
in this and the subsequent tables were obtained from a simulation run of 90000 patent draws
26Note that the age proﬁles we examine are right censored at age thirteen since this is the longest age proﬁle of
the oldest patent cohort in our estimation sample.
27In out of sample predictions, we also found that the probabilities sharply decrease when patents get closer to
the maximum legal length of patent protection (age 17 for patents applied for before 1997), which is consistent with
the evidence on the transfer of patents presented in section 2.
28This magnitude of the MSE is comparable to the reported MSE in Pakes (1986).
25Table 2: Parameter Estimates
Description (Parameter) Estimate
A. Patent initial returns, depreciation, and obsolescence
Depreciation factor () 0.9003 (4.35*10-2)
Full Depreciation () 0.9702 (7.60*10-3)
Mean parameter of the Lognormal Initial Distribution () 8.3115 (4.50*10-3)
Std. Deviation parameter of the Lognormal Initial Distribution () 1.7202 (4.30*10-3)
B. Market for technology and costs of technology transfer
Cost of Technology transfer () 5,494.8 (63.46)
Mean External Growth of Returns () 0.3775 (2.70*10-3)
Proportion of unsuccessful transfers () 0.0386 (2.86*10-4)
Random transfers () 0.0053 (8.15*10-4)
Size of sample 54,840
Simulations in the estimation 164,520
MSE 4.2447*10-4
Estimated standard errors in parenthesis.
MSE is the sum of squared residuals of the diﬀerence between the estimated and the actual
moment conditions divided by 186, the number of moment conditions.
using the estimates in b  and the renewal fee schedule of the year 1988 (in 2003 dollars).29 There
are two results in this table that are worth highlighting. First, the left tail of the distribution
of per period returns becomes thicker with age. Per period returns decreased and a signiﬁcant
proportion of patents became obsolete between ages one, four, and seven. Eleven percent of the
patents at age one had per period returns below $500; this proportion doubled (226 percent)
by age four, and was 332 at age seven. The median of the distribution of per period returns
($4080) at age one dropped by approximately half ($2447) by age four. The median per period
return dropped to $1404 by age seven. The second result to note is that the distribution of per
period returns at age one is highly skewed. At the same time that about twenty percent of the
patents have returns at age one below or equal $1000, only the top 35 percent had returns above
$100000.T h e s eﬁndings suggests a highly skewed distribution of patent value.
In Table A-2, we provide the percentiles of the distribution of patent values at age one, four and
seven. The value of a patent is deﬁned as the discounted present value of the per period returns
(minus the renewal fees if the patent is renewed, and minus the costs of technology transfer if
the patent is sold) from age one, four or seven to the maximum legal length of patent protection.
Column (1) presents the patent value as of age one. Twenty-ﬁve percent of the patents in a patent
29Alternatively we could have used the average of the renewal fee schedule across all the year in the sample. We
d on o te x p e c tt h er e s u l t st ob ed i ﬀerent.
26cohort had values below or equal to $4584. These patents accounted for 07 percent of the total
value of patents in a cohort, while the bottom ﬁfty-percent of the patents contributed a slightly
less than 4 percent of the total value in a cohort. The value of the median patent at age one
was $16184 and the mean $76598 The top 10 percent of the highest valued patents accounted
for approximately seventy percent of the total value of a cohort. These ﬁndings conﬁrm a very
skewed distribution of patent values. The rest of the columns in the table present the distribution
of patent value at ages four and seven. A last result we want to highlight is that the distribution
of patent value appears to become more skewed with patent age.
Parameters  and  jointly determine the potential beneﬁts of transferring patents. Recall
that there is a probability  that after a patent trade the returns are zero. Alternatively, with
probability (1 − ) the patent returns are based on the improvement factor observed prior to
the transfer of the patent. The low estimate of  (about 00386) indicates that in most of
the transfers the realized returns depend on the observed improvement factor of the potential
buyer. In other words, the uncertainty of the potential beneﬁts of acquiring a patent involves
about a four percent premium.30 The improvement factor that determines the returns of a buyer
is a function of the parameter .A h i g h  is associated with higher improvement factors
and thus higher patent returns. The estimate of  implies that with probability 0071 the
patent returns of the buyer in a given period are higher than the ones of the current owner.
Furthermore, conditional on a buyer having higher returns than a current owner, the buyer’s per
period returns are thirty-eight percent higher than the ones of the current owner. These ﬁndings
suggest important beneﬁts of reallocating the ownership of a patent from the original inventor
to a new owner for whom the patent has a higher value. Furthermore, the low estimate of 
implies that about half of a percentage point of the simulated proportion of active patents can be
accounted for our speciﬁcation of the measurement error in the trade of patents.31
Another important point to note is that the estimate of the costs of technology transfer 
is signiﬁcant (about $5500) The sunk costs of technology transfer are equivalent to a third of
the estimated average patent return at age one. Alternatively, these costs represent about eight
percent of the average present value of a patent at age one. The magnitude of the estimated costs
of technology transfer points at the possibility of signiﬁcant selection eﬀects into the trading of
patents.
30Given our model speciﬁcation, an alternative interpretation could be that the variable component of the costs
of technology transfer represent about a four percent of the sale price of a patent.
31An alternative is that half of a percentage point of the simulated proportion of the traded patents can be
accounted for a transfer process that does not involve neither sunk nor variable costs of technology transfer.
276 The market for innovation and gains from trade
This section documents our empirical results for the volume of the market for innovation and
the gains from trade. We ﬁrst compare the value of the traded and untraded patents. We then
estimate the volume of the market for innovation, which is the total value of the traded patents.
We end the section by quantifying how much of this volume is gains from trading patents.
In Table A-3A, we present the distribution of patent value at age one for both the traded
and the untraded patents. Traded patents are those that were sold at least once over their life
cycle; untraded patents are the rest. The ﬁrst result we want to highlight is that the mean of the
distribution of the value of patents eventually traded ($164670) is about three times larger than
the mean of the distribution of value of the patents untraded ($50162).T h eﬁnding that traded
patents have a higher value than the untraded ones is consistent across the percentiles of the
distribution of the value of the traded and untraded patents. Furthermore, the diﬀerence between
the value of the traded and the untraded patents increases over the percentiles of the distributions.
Diﬀerences range from few thousand dollars at the ﬁfth percentile of each distribution ($654 and
$4877 for untraded and traded patents, respectively) to about two million dollars at the 99th
percentile ($1687702 and $3754001).
Table A-3B quantiﬁes the volume of the trade of patents. We consider two indicator variables
for transactions in the market for innovation: the proportion of patents traded and the value of
the traded patents. In the ﬁrst row we report that the traded patents represent 231 percent of
all the patents.32 In other words, among all the patents in our simulation, twenty-three percent
of them were traded at least once over their life cycle. The next row shows that the value of the
traded patents represents 496 percent of the total value of patents as of age one. This estimate
correspond to the total value of the patents traded as a percentage of the value of all the patents.
This result indicates the importance of the market for innovation. The volume of the market for
US small ﬁrm granted patents in between 1988-1997 is then approximately $208 billion33
In Table A-4, we begin tackling the issue of selection in the trade of patents. The gross
diﬀerences between the value of the traded and the untraded patents (and thus the value of
volume of the trade in patents) can be due to potential gains from trade, but also because patents
with higher returns are more likely to be traded. Column (1) presents the probability that a
patent is traded obtained from simulations based on the estimated costs of technology transfer.
32The number of traded patents is equal to the proportion of traded patents (023) times the number of patents
in our estimation sample (54840).
33This is the number of patents (54840) × the proportion of patents traded (0231) × the value at age one of a
patent eventually traded ($164670).
28The bottom row shows the sample probability that a patent is traded over the life cycle, while
the rest of the rows report the same probability across groups of patents formed based on the
percentiles of the distribution of per period returns at age one. The sample probability that a
patent is traded (0231) is more than four times larger than the probability of patents with per
period returns at age one in between the 10 and 25 percentile (005) Furthermore, patents
with per period returns at age one below the 10 percentile are virtually not traded. In contrast,
the trade of patents is much more common at the highest percentiles of the distribution of per
period returns at age one. For instance, forty percent of the patents in between the 75 and 80
percentiles are traded over their life cycle. These results conﬁrm that there is selection in the
trade of patents and suggests that this selection can account for a sizable part of the value of the
volume of the trade of patents.
Table A-6A quantiﬁes how much of this volume of the trade in patents is due to gains from
trade. The gains from trade were obtained by comparing the value of a patent actually traded
with the value that the same patent would have obtained had the option to sell it to a potential
buyer not been allowed for over the patent’s life cycle. Column (1) and (2) report the average
patent value at age one of traded patents with and without the possibility to transfer it to buyers.
In Column (3) we present the average realized gain from trade as a percentage of the value of
a traded patent across the percentiles of the distribution of patent returns at age one. Gains
from trade for the average traded patent represent an additional 10 percent to the value that the
original patentee could have earned by keeping the patent. We also show that the gains from trade
as a percentage of patent value are heterogeneous across patents based on their initial returns at
age one. The average gains from trade range from as low as zero for traded patents with per period
returns below the 10 percentile to as high as 11 percent for patents with per period returns at
around the 99 percentile. For traded patents with per period returns at age one in between the
50 and 75 percentile, about 9 percent of their value was due to gains from trade. An advantage
of structurally estimating the parameters of the model is that a simple counterfactual allow us
quantify the gains from patent trading while at the same time account for selection in the trade
of patents.
In Table A-5, we assess in more detail the skewness and the distribution of the value of the
gains from trade. This table provides percentiles and cumulative percent of the distribution of
the gains from trade of the traded patents. The result we want to highlight here is that the
distribution of the gains from reallocating patents to new owners is highly skewed. The table
reports that ﬁfty percent of the traded patents had gains from trade below or equal $3416 (the
mean of the value of the trade of patents is about $15008). These patents accounted for only 37
29percent of the total value of the gains from trade of patents in a cohort. On the other hand, the
top ten percent of the patents with the largest gains from trade accounted for about 68 percent
of the realized gains from trade. These ﬁndings indicate that only a small share of the patents
contributes signiﬁcantly to the realized gains from trade.
These ﬁndings suggest that the market for innovation generates signiﬁcant gains from trade
for small ﬁrms, but that only a small proportion of the traded patents account for signiﬁcant
share of the realized gains from trading patents.
7E ﬀects of costs of technology transfer on the trade of patents
and gains from trading patents
The remaining of our analysis studies the eﬀect of lowering the costs of technology transfer on
both the proportion of patents traded and the gains from trading patents. To this extent, we
decrease the costs of technology transfer by ﬁfty percent, i.e., from $5495 to $2747 while keeping
the rest of the parameters at their original estimated levels.
Several results emerge from this counterfactual experiment. First, we study the eﬀects of
reducing the costs of technology transfer on the probability that a patent is traded. Column (2)
in Table A-4 reports the probability that a patent is traded across groups of patents based on their
initial returns at age one, as well as the overall sample probability that a patent is traded. First,
there are two aspects worth highlighting here. The probability that a patent is traded increases by
six percentage points (from 0231 to 0296) Moreover, we show that the change in the probability
that a patent is traded is heterogeneous across patents based on their initial returns at age one.
Patents with returns in between the percentiles around the median of the distribution of initial
returns at age one (25 and 75) increased their probability of trade by about ten percentage
points, while the rest of the patents were much less aﬀected by the lower costs of technology
transfer.
S e c o n d ,i nT a b l eA - 7 ,w ep r e s e n tt h ee ﬀects of lowering the costs of technology transfer on
the gains from trading patents. Column (1) presents the percentage change in the value of the
gains from trade for all patents and across groups of patents based on the initial returns at age
one. In Column (2), we present the cumulative distribution of the additional gains from trade
of the traded patents across groups of patents based on their initial returns at age one, and in
Column (3) we show the cumulative distribution of the gains from trade prior to the reduction
of the costs of technology transfer across the same groups of patents. There are two ﬁndings we
especially want to highlight. First, in Column (1) we show that the gains from trading patents
30increase by about 10%. That is, decreasing the costs of technology transfer by ﬁfty percent have
limited increases in the total value of the gains from trade. Second, in Column (2) we show that
the source of the additional gains from trade are patents with returns in between the median
and the seventy-ﬁve percentile of the distribution of initial returns at age one. While the bottom
seventy ﬁve percent of the traded patents with the lowest returns at age one account for 38%
of the additional gains from trade, the patents with returns at age one in between the ﬁfty and
seventy percentile account for about 24% to the additional gains from trade. In contrast, in
Column (3) we show that the patents with the lowest seventy-ﬁve percent of initial returns at
age one accounted for only 6% of the gains from trade. These ﬁndings suggest that the potential
beneﬁts associated with reductions in the costs of technology transfer are limited, but that the
patents that will beneﬁt the most are those with returns at age one somewhat above the median
of the distribution of initial returns at age one.
Taken together, the ﬁndings of this counterfactual indicate that while the proportion of patents
traded increases signiﬁcantly, the beneﬁts of reducing the costs of technology transfer on the
realized gains from trading patents appear to be limited.
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops and estimates a model of the transfer and renewal that, under some assump-
tions, allows us to quantify the gains from trading patents and the costs of technology transfer in
the market for innovation. The model is estimated using new data on the transfer of patents in
a sample of patents applied for and granted to US small ﬁrms.
Several ﬁndings emerge from our analysis. First, the volume of the trade of patents represents
about ﬁfty percent of the total value of all patents. Second, the gains from the trade of these
patents represent about ten percent of the volume of the trade of patents. Third, we showed that
the distribution of the gains from trade was highly skewed, and that a small fraction of the traded
patents accounted for a large part of the realized gains from trade. Fourth, we studied the eﬀects
of lowering the costs of technology transfer by ﬁfty percent, and found that the probability that
a patent is traded increases by six percentage points and the value of the gains from trade rises
by only ten percent.
The ﬁndings in this paper indicate that the market for innovation generates signiﬁcant gains
from trade for small ﬁrms, but that only a small proportion of the traded patents accounts for a
large share of the beneﬁts. Our interpretation is that as long as small ﬁrms can appropriate part
of the gains from patent trading, this market increases the incentives to innovate. The result that
31only a small proportion of patents will generate signiﬁcant gains from trade may have important
implications in the institutional settings and market structure of the intermediaries of the market
for innovation. Moreover, we found that the costs of technology transfer aﬀect the workings of the
market for innovation by reducing the proportion of patents sold and generating at the same time
a selection in the trade of patents. There seem to be, however, limited beneﬁts from reducing
these costs from the current level.
At the same time, this paper may have some limitations. We likely examine a domain where
the sale of patents may be considerably more useful than for the larger ﬁrms. In this respect our
estimates may overestimate the overall gains from patent trading in the economy. Nevertheless,
our model and empirical methodology is with ease portable to other related domains such as large
ﬁrms. At the same time our sample does not contain the licensing of patents, and thus the beneﬁts
of the market for innovation could be much larger. A limitation of our setting is that it does not
allow for the possibility that ﬁrms may choose to increase patenting as well as to specialize in
what they excel. Our data also exhibited some limitations such as not linking the type and the
name of ﬁrms acquiring patents, not reporting the sale prices, and not collecting the contractual
terms in the patent transactions. These limitations provide opportunities for further research.
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35Appendix: Proofs, Tables and Figures
Lemma 1. The value function () is continuous and increasing in the current return of the holder of
the patent,  and the return factor of the potential buyer,  The option value +1(00|) is
decreasing in .
Proof. The option value +1(00|) depends on whether or not the patent has been sold, kept, or
renewed at age. If the patent is sold ( =1 ) , +1(00|)=+1(00|); if the patent is kept
by the current owner, +1(00|)=+1(00|); the option value +1(00|)=
0 whenever the patent is allowed to expire. For convenience, let us consider the option value be +1(00|)
where  ∈ {0} depending on whether the patent was sold (),k e p t(), or allowed to expire (0) The proof
is separated into two parts. Parts (i) shows that the option value is continuous and increasing with ; part (ii)
proves that the option value is decreasing with a. Both proofs are by induction on  Let  be the maximum legal
length of patent protection.
Part (i). Since [+1(00|)] = 0 for all  the initial condition of the inductive argument is satisﬁed.
Now, suppose that the result holds for  +1 ,i ts u ﬃces to show that the result also holds for  The hypothesis
of the inductive argument is that [+2(00|)] is continuous and increasing in  Recall that +1()=
max{ 
+1()
+1()0} and that  ()= −  −  + [+2(00|]()= −
 + [+2(00|] So, +1() is also continuous and weakly increasing in  ∈ {0}. Finally, we
want to show that if +1() is also continuous and increasing in  ∈ {0} then [+1(00|)]
is also continuos and increasing in  Since the joint distribution of the internal and external returns () is














To prove continuity, take any  ∈ + [+1(00|)] will be continuous at  if for every sequence {}
such that lim()= we can show that lim
→([+1(00|)]) = [+1(00|)] Since () and

























where second step follows, in particular, because (.) is independent of , and the last step follows because
+1(




Part (ii). We want to show that [+1(00|)] is weakly decreasing in  The initial condition of
the inductive argument requires to show that [+1(00|)] ≤ [(00|)] Since patents are active
for  periods, then [+1(00|)] = 0 Moreover, by deﬁnition of (00|) ≥ 0 so it must be the
case that [(00|)] The induction hypothesis is that [+2(00|)] ≤ [+1(00|)] It suﬃces
36to show that [+1(00|)] ≤ [(00|)] Recall that +1(00|)=m a x {0 − +1 −  +
[+2(0000|0)] 0 − +1 + [+2(0000|0)]0}
≤ max{0 − − +[+1(0000|)] 0 − +[+1(0000|0)]} = (00|),w h e r et h e
















where the inequality follows because +1(00|) ≤ (00|), (.) is independent of  and  is such
that given  the Pr(0  |) decreases with .
Lemma 2 For a ﬁxed ,  and  , we can show that: (a) If  
 ()− 
 () ≥ 0 then  
 ()−
 
 () is increasing with  (b) the  
 () −  
 () is increasing with 
Proof. This Lemma will be useful in the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2. For convenience, let me deﬁne e () as
 
 (),t h a ti s




So, since  
 ()= 
 () − then  
 ()=e () − 
Let us start proving part (a) of the Lemma. That is the case when the owner of the patent is indiﬀerent
between selling the patent or keep it (i.e., any per period revenue such b ).
The proof is by induction on 
1) Suppose  =  (i.e., the last period).
 
 () −  
 ()= −  −  = ( − 1) − 
Recall that  
 () −  
 () ≥ 0 so it must the case that   0 Then,  
 () −  
 () is
decreasing with 
2) Suppose that the result holds for +1 So, the induction hypothesis is that for a ﬁxed  the [ 
+1()−
 
+1()] is increasing with  Then, it suﬃces to show that for a ﬁxed  the [ 
 () −  
 ()] is
increasing with  Without loss of generality we can consider that  
We can rewrite [ 
 () −  
 ()] as
 
 () −  















Since and  = 
−1 then It is obvious to show that ( −−) is increasing with  Let us look at






)] Since  and  are independent of  it just






)] is increasing with 
We can rewrite the equivalent of the induction hypothesis as
[ 
+1() −  
+1()] = e +1() −  − e +1()
which is weakly increasing with 
37There are three cases to study.

















) That is in  region with (















































) −  − e +1(
)
= e +1(
) −  − e +1(
)
where the last expression is an increasing transformation of the equivalent of the induction hypothesis (i.e.,






) is increasing with 
Case (2): ﬁx  and consider a realization of 
 and 
 such that, in  region with (




































−1) − e +1(
)
= e +1(
) − e +1(
)
where the last expression is an increasing transformation of the equivalent of the induction hypothesis (i.e.,






) is weakly increasing with 
Case (3): ﬁx  and consider a realization of 
 and 
 such that, in  region with (










































) − e +1(

)
where the last expression is an increasing transformation of the equivalent of the induction hypothesis (i.e.,






) is increasing with 
Let us now prove part (b) of the Lemma. We want to show that the  
 ()− 
 () is increasing with
 We know that  
 ()=0  So,  
 () −  
 ()= 
 () For a ﬁxed  and 
 Lemma 1
shows that  
 () is increasing with  Therefore,  
 () −  
 () is also increasing with 
Proposition 1. For each age, there exist cutoﬀ rules b () and b 
()  1 such that patents with an
improvement factor above b 
() will be sold. Among the patent holders that met a potential buyer with
improvement factor below b 
() the patents with per period returns  above b () will be renewed,
and those with returns  below b () will be retained by their current owners.
Proof. We ﬁr s ts h o wt h a tt h e r ee x i s tac u t o ﬀ rule b 
() deﬁned as the improvement factor that makes a
potential seller indiﬀerent between whether or not to sell the patent. Two cases must be analyzed: (a) The seller
38is indiﬀerent between selling and letting the patent expire (i.e.,  
 (b 
()) = 0); and (b) The seller is
indiﬀerent between selling and keeping the patent (i.e.,  
 (b 
()) =  
 (b 
())).
Let us start with case (a). Lemma 1 implies that, for a ﬁxed  e () is an increasing function of  We
can show that for any 0 if  =0  e () − 0 We can also show that for any 0 there exist
as u ﬃciently high , for example  that e () − 0 Therefore, by Bolzano’s theorem, there exist an
improvement factor b 
() such that
e (b 




In case (b) the potential seller is indiﬀerent between selling and keeping the patent. That is  
 ()=
 
 () which implies that
e (b 
()) −  = e ()
Now, let us consider a 0 and a  =1  We can show that  
 ()− 
 ()  0 because  
 ()=
 
 () −  =  
 () −  On the other hand, for ﬁxed  and ﬁxed  L e m m a1s h o w st h a t 
 () is
increasing in  So, for suﬃciently high  we can show that  
 () −  
 ()  0 Finally, by Lemma 2
we know that for a ﬁxed , the diﬀerence ( 
 ()− 
 ()) is increasing in  By Bolzano’s theorem, there
exist a b 
() such that  
 (b 
()) =  
 (b 
()) which is that
e (b 
()) −  = e ()
The second part of the proof shows that there exist a per period return b () such that patents with per period
return b () will be allowed to expire while the rest of the patents will be renewed. The cutoﬀ rule b () is
deﬁned as the patent revenue that makes a patent owner indiﬀerent between keeping the patent and letting it expire
(i.e.,  
 (b )=0 )  Recall that  
 ()=+[+1(00)|]− and the function  
 ()
is increasing with  by Lemma 1. Moreover, if  =0 ,  
 ()  0; and if  is positive and suﬃciently large
 
 ()  0 Therefore, Bolzano’s theorem implies that there is a b  such that  
 (b )=0 ) 
Proposition 2. The following properties characterize the functions b () and b 
():
(a) The function b () is increasing with patent age  at the renewal dates.
(b) If the costs of technology transfer  are positive, then
(b.1) For a ﬁxed patent age , the function b 
() is monotonically decreasing with 
(b.2) For a ﬁxed patent return , the function b 
() is monotonically increasing with patent age

Proof. Part (a). We want to show that b () is increasing with patent age  at the renewal dates. From
proposition 1 we know that that there exist a renewal date  and patent revenue b  such that  
 (b  b )=0 
Similarly we can obtain that  
+1(b +1b +1)=0because the schedule of renewal fees is increasing with
 Note that  
+1(b +1 b +1)= 
 (b  b ) Because the function  
 () is increasing with  and 
(see Lemma 1). then it must be the case that b +1 ≥ b  for the above equality to hold.
Part (b.1) [Selection Eﬀect]. We want to show that the cutoﬀ rule b 
() is decreasing with  For convenience,
let me deﬁne 
 () as e (),t h a ti s




So, since  
 ()= 
 () −  then  
 ()=e () − 
39Let us ﬁrst consider when the owner of the patent is indiﬀerent between selling the patent or let it allow to
expire. That is any per period revenue such  ≤ b .P r o p o s i t i o n1i m p l i e st h a tt h e r ei sac u t o ﬀ rule b 
() and





()) −  =0
From Lemma 1 we know that for a ﬁxed  the function  
 ()=e () −  is increasing with 
So, for the above equality to hold, it must be the case that if  increases then b 
() decreases.
Let us now consider the case when the owner of the patent is indiﬀerent between selling the patent or keep it.
That is any per period revenue such b .
The proof is by induction on 
1) Suppose  =  (i.e., the maximum legal length of patent protection). A seller is indiﬀerent between selling





() −  = 
And we can show that b 





2) Suppose now that b 
() is decreasing with  for  +1 . We want to show that the result holds for 
Notice that the induction hypothesis (i.e., b 
() is decreasing with  for +1)is equivalent to showing that for
a ﬁxed  the [ 
+1()− 
+1()] is weakly increasing in  Therefore, in order to prove that b 
() in
decreasing in  for age ,i ts u ﬃc e st os h o wt h a tf o raﬁxed  the diﬀerence [ 
 ()− 
 ()] is increasing
in 
Note that b 
() for any  is only deﬁned for  such that b 
() ≥ 1 ∀ ∈ [1] So, without loss of
generality we can consider  Finally, by Lemma 2, see especially part (2) of the proof, we show that for a
ﬁxed , ,a n d the [ 
 () −  
 ()] is increasing with  As argued above, this results is equivalent
to showing that the function b 
() is decreasing with 
Part (b.2) [Horizon Eﬀect]. We want to show that for any 0 and 0 the cutoﬀ rule b 
() is
increasing with  For convenience, let me deﬁne e () as  
 () as
e ()= −  + [+1(
)]
So, since  
 ()= 
 () − then  
 ()=e () − 
Showing that for a ﬁxed  and  the cutoﬀ rule b 
() is weakly increasing with  is equivalent to proving
that for a ﬁxed  and  the diﬀerence [ 
 () −  
 ()] is decreasing with  That is,
[ 
 () −  
 ()]  [ 
+1() −  
+1()]
40And rearranging the induction hypothesis we obtain,
e () −  − e ()  e +1() −  − e +1()
e () − e ()  e +1() − e +1()
 −  + [+1(


)] −  +  − [+1(






































Without loss of generality, consider per period revenues  and ,  , such that [ 
 ()− 
 ()] ≥ 0
The proof is by induction.
1) Suppose  +1=,s o =  − 1 We want to show that
[ 
 () −  
 ()]  [ 
+1() −  
+1()]
Let us start deﬁning
 
 () −  
 ()=e () −  − e ()= −  − 
 






















−1) The expectation of a random variable that is larger or









−1() −  







≥  −  − 
=  
 () −  
 ()
Therefore, [ 
 () −  
 ()]  [ 
+1() −  
+1()]
2) Now, suppose that the relationship holds for  +1  So, the induction hypothesis is
[ 
+1() −  
+1()]  [ 
+2() −  
+2()]
e +1() −  − e +1()  e +2() −  − e +2()
e +1() − e +1()  e +2() − e +2()
We will show that it holds for  that is
[ 
 () −  
 ()]  [ 




 () −  
 ()=e () −  − e ()
=  −  + [+1(


















=  −  −  + [+2(
+1
+1





+1() −  
+1()
42Table A-1: Distribution of the Patent Returns at Age One, Four, and Seven
Patent
Returns Age 1 Age 4 Age 7
(1) (2) (3)
50 0.6 9.7 22.1
250 5.2 15.7 25.6
500 11.1 22.6 33.2
1,000 20.6 32.9 44.0
5,000 54.7 64.4 72.3
10,000 69.8 77.1 82.8
25,000 85.2 89.3 92.5
100,000 96.8 97.8 98.6
500,000 99.7 99.9 99.9
Mean 17,999 12,716 9,019
Table A-2: Distribution of the Value of Patents at Age 1, 4, and 7
Patent value at age 1 Patent value at age 4 Patent value at age 7
Value Cum % Value Cum % Value Cum %
Percentile (US$ 2003) of Total (US$ 2003) of Total (US$ 2003) of Total
(1) (2) (3)
5 787 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
10 1,472 0.1 134 0.0 0 0.0
25 4,584 0.7 1,426 0.2 431 0.0
50 16,184 3.7 8,664 2.3 4,180 1.2
75 54,950 13.9 35,616 11.2 22,231 8.8
80 74,198 18.1 48,881 15.2 31,379 12.5
90 160,829 32.3 110,991 29.1 75,121 26.1
98.5 763,483 67.5 550,287 65.4 390,948 63.3
99.8 2,432,580 88.0 1,777,078 86.9 1,303,508 86.2
Mean 76,598 52,669 35,835
43Table A-3: Distribution of the Value of Traded and Untraded Patents
Untraded patents Traded patents
(1) (2)
A. Distribution of the value of patents
Percentile Value Cum % Value Cum %
(US$ 2003) of Total (US$ 2003) of Total
5 654 0.0 4,877 0.0
10 1,184 0.1 9,561 0.3
25 3,353 0.8 23,948 1.8
50 10,605 4.0 58,320 7.7
75 33,955 13.7 149,614 22.1
80 44,978 17.6 188,927 27.2
90 98,251 30.8 355,898 42.7
98.5 502,777 64.8 1,285,141 74.6
99.8 1,687,702 87.0 3,754,001 90.6
Mean value 50,162 164,670
B. Summary statistics
Percentage (of all patents) 0.77 0.23
Value of patents as a percentage
of the total value 0.51 0.49
Table A-4: Probability that a Patent is Traded over the Life Cycle
Percentile Probability Probability
Initial return at of Trade of Trade











All sample 0.231 0.296
44Table A-5: Distribution of the Gains from Trade of Traded Patents
Gains from trade
Cum %
Percentile Value of Total










Table A-6: Value of Traded Patents and Gains from Trade in the Market for Patents
Value of Traded Patents With and Without Option to Sell the Patent and Gains from Trade [ =$ 5 495]
Percentile Market for patents active Market for patents non-active
Initial returns at age one Average Patent value Average Patent value Gains from
of traded patents (US$ 2003) (US$ 2003) Trade (%)
(1) (2) (3)
5 466 466 0.000
5-10 1,190 1,190 0.000
10-25 3,066 3,038 0.010
25-50 10,839 10,283 0.054
50-75 34,380 31,577 0.089
75-80 66,073 59,933 0.102
80-90 112,510 102,167 0.101
90-98.5 328,650 298,253 0.102
98.5-99.8 1,250,645 1,119,970 0.117
Mean (all) 164,670 149,662 0.100
Table A-7: Percentage Changed in the Gains from Trade of Traded Patents and Cummulative
Gains from Trade After Decreasing the Costs of Technology Transfer by Fifty Percent
Percentile Additional
Initial return at Change in the Average Gains from Trade Average Gains from Trade
Gains from Trade [ =2 747] [ =5 495]
age one (Cum %) (cum %)
(1) (2) (3)
25 6.662 0.004 0.000
25-50 1.397 0.068 0.005
50-75 0.433 0.306 0.063
75-80 0.239 0.385 0.098
80-90 0.167 0.598 0.234
90-98.5 0.062 0.829 0.628
98.5-99.8 0.043 0.935 0.890
All patents 0.106






















Figure 3: Probability that an active patent is traded for previously traded and untraded patents






Probability of an active patent being traded conditional on having being previously traded







Probability of an active patent being traded conditional on having being previously untraded
Model
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Model
Data
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